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NO. 17 MARCH 2019 Introduction 
Macron, the Yellow Vests and the 
National Debate 
Playing for Time, Not Solving the Political Legitimacy Crisis 
Ronja Kempin and Paweł Tokarski 
France’s yellow vests (gilets jaunes) are heterogeneous, make contradictory demands, 
and refuse to give up. Since November 2018 they have been demonstrating for more 
purchasing power and greater democracy. Having made financial concessions, Presi-
dent Emmanuel Macron is now playing for time. He has initiated a “grand national 
debate”, in which all citizens were called on to voice their opinions concerning future 
political issues. This debate is likely to help him win the European Parliament (EP) 
elections in May and facilitate splintering the yellow vests. To avert further protests 
that could paralyse the country, delegitimise his government and ensure that his 
presidency fails, Macron needs to improve the way he communicates his reform 
agenda. Merely playing for time will not make France reformable and governable 
for this president, any more than it did for his predecessors. 
 
The protests never end. Since 17 November 
2018, people wearing high-visibility yel-
low vests have been taking to the streets 
of France on Saturdays. The protests by 
the yellow vests, organised nationwide, were 
initially directed against the higher tax on 
fossil fuels planned by President Macron. 
They quickly evolved into a list of 42 
demands. The yellow vests want the president 
to lower “all taxes”, raise the minimum 
wage and pensions, and also to reintroduce 
the wealth tax abolished in 2018. Many of 
their demands are in line with the election 
promises Macron made during the 2017 
campaign: lower taxes, more purchasing 
power, and greater democracy. The protests 
are held by the rural lower-middle class, 
including craftsmen and women and shop-
keepers. They can barely earn a living from 
their work and are afraid of sliding into 
poverty. Politically, according the yellow 
vests, they have no voice. They reject the 
support of the trade unions and parties of 
the political left, which previously chan-
nelled similar social demands. Politics, 
they insist, should be conducted by and 
for “ordinary people”. There should be 
more political participation, for example 
by allowing citizens’ or popular initiatives 
to launch referendums (référendum d’initia-
tive citoyenne). 
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The Government’s Response 
President Macron rapidly came under pres-
sure: despite the violent excesses that over-
shadowed the demonstrations, initially over 
70 percent of the French population sup-
ported the protesters’ demands. 
Change of Course 
In early December 2018, Macron there-
fore suspended the planned tax increase 
on petrol and diesel. Shortly afterwards, 
he announced four immediate measures: 
to subsidise the minimum wage by up to 
100 euros per month with public money; to 
bring forward the tax and duty exemption 
for overtime payments originally planned 
for September 2019; to exempt all pension 
payments below 2,000 euros from taxes; 
and to pay out a tax-free premium to em-
ployees at the end of 2018 if companies are 
capable of doing so. 
However, these concessions failed to end 
the protests. To date, President Macron has 
not been able to convince the people that 
his reform agenda is as necessary as it is 
right. Since taking office, he has trans-
formed France at record speed: making 
labour laws more flexible, providing finan-
cial relief for companies, and reforming the 
education system and the SNCF state rail-
way. In the course of these reforms, his 
popularity ratings have fallen. He ignored 
the fact that he received more votes when 
elected in April/May 2017 from the left of 
the political spectrum than from the con-
servative camp. He postponed the reform 
of the welfare state, which was particularly 
important for the left, instead abolishing 
the wealth tax (except on real estate) and 
introducing a flat tax of 30 percent on all 
capital gains. Macron is thus regarded as 
a “president of the rich” who furthers in-
equality in the country. However, France’s 
inequality level – measured statistically by 
the S80/S20 average income ratio of 20 per-
cent of the richest and 20 percent of the 
poorest people in a country – is lower than 
in most other EU countries: 13.3 percent of 
the French population were at risk of pov-
erty in 2017. This relatively small figure 
needs to be contextualised: about half of 
those polled say they have no money left 
in their account by the end of the month. 
No Fiscal Leeway 
President Macron cannot make any more 
financial concessions to the yellow vests: 
he lacks the leeway. The emergency meas-
ures adopted will cost the French govern-
ment eight to ten billion euros per year, 
according to its own estimates. It is un-
known whether this already includes the 
postponement of the planned eco-tax in-
crease, but either way France is likely to 
miss the Maastricht criteria once again in 
2019. With a deficit of 2.7 percent of gross 
domestic product (GDP), Paris met the Maas-
tricht threshold of 3 percent in 2017 for the 
first time in nine years. For 2019, the gov-
ernment had planned a deficit of 2.8 per-
cent of GDP. Ten billion euros more would 
correspond to an additional debt of 0.5 per-
centage points. According to an agreement 
with the EU Commission, France’s deficit is 
allowed to exceed the 3 percent threshold 
in 2019, but not in subsequent years. 
Moreover, social tensions are likely to 
have an impact on the labour market. Al-
though the unemployment rate has fallen 
to its lowest level since 2009 (8.8 percent in 
the fourth quarter of 2018) and, according 
to experts, will continue to fall until 2022, 
the positive effects Macron had hoped for 
from his labour-law reforms have so far 
been modest. One problem is the high num-
ber of fixed-term contracts: almost 85 per-
cent of new hires are temporary. There is 
also significant social exclusion from the 
labour market. In France, the proportion 
of 20- to 34-year-olds who were not in edu-
cation, employment or training in 2017 was 
higher (18.2 percent) than in Germany (11.9 
percent). Furthermore, France’s tax-to-GDP 
ratio is the highest of all OECD countries. 
According to Eurostat, it amounts to 48.2 
percent of GDP and is thus well above the 
eurozone average of 41.4 percent. Further 
taxation of the economy appears to be 
ruled out. 
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Finally, President Macron cannot meet 
the demands of the yellow vests to solve the 
country’s economic and social problems 
through greater state intervention. At 56.5 
percent of GDP in 2017, France’s share of 
public spending was the highest among 
OECD countries. The country’s oversized 
public sector is one of the main reasons 
for its chronic budget deficits. 
The Debate: A Smart Move 
Against this background, Macron’s “grand 
débat national” is his only promising way 
out of the crisis. Since mid-January, citizens 
of the country have been invited to express 
their opinions and ideas on the following 
topics online and in organised debates: 
ecological change; taxes and government 
spending; democracy, participation, repre-
sentation and coexistence; and state struc-
tures and public services. The discussions 
ended in mid-March, and the President 
plans to present their results in April 2019. 
This debate is proving to be a clever 
move for three reasons: first, it allows Presi-
dent Macron to use the French mayors to 
his advantage. They organised over 60 per-
cent of the debates. And yet almost all of 
them belong to the opposition, meaning 
the conservative, communist or socialist 
parties, or are non-partisan. Relationship 
between the president and local politicians 
have been frosty. Since 2014, 750 mayors 
have resigned – more than ever before. 
More than 50 percent do not intend to 
run again in the local elections in 2020. In 
France, mayors have a dual role: on the one 
hand, they are representatives of the state 
and, on the other, they are directly elected 
representatives of their community. They 
feel abandoned by the state in coping with 
everyday problems and increasingly see 
their competences curtailed. For example, 
they complain about the closure of police 
and fire stations, schools and post offices. 
In July 2018 they refused the president’s 
invitation to a national conference on rural 
areas, and in September 1,200 mayors re-
minded him that they were above all com-
mitted to the well-being of their voters. 
Macron has now granted them this role 
again, while at the same time making them 
executive bodies of his policy. 
Second, the debate helped to divide the 
yellow vests movement: they do not have a 
homogenous attitude towards it. According 
to surveys, about 40 percent of the French 
population wants to take part in the debate. 
Repeatedly, yellow vests also found their 
way to events of the “grand national debate”. 
They are broadly in agreement with the 
issues raised by President Macron. In late 
January 2019, other yellow vests launched 
a “true debate” (le vrai débat) on France’s 
future to compete with Macron’s debate. 
The yellow vests who have been part of the 
movement from the very start, on the other 
hand, are arguing about whether the use of 
police force during yellow-vest protests may 
be met with violence. These disputes cost 
public empathy. While in November 2018 
71 percent of the population still agreed 
with the demands and actions of the yellow 
vests, in March 2019 54 percent did so. Sim-
ultaneously, part of the movement is politi-
cising – some are making initial attempts 
to draw up a list for the European elections 
in May. 
This is Macron’s third advantage. A yel-
low vest list would deprive both Marine Le 
Pen’s far-wing Rassemblement National (RN) 
and the left-wing populist La France Insou-
mise (FI) of votes. It could therefore make 
a decisive contribution to Macron winning 
the EP election. Long before the yellow 
vests protests began, Marine Le Pen styled 
this election as a vote on the president’s 
policy to date. While Macron’s La République 
en Marche (LaREM) party is still looking for 
a prominent top candidate and suitable 
topics for its European election programme, 
Le Pen has been ready for the election cam-
paign since mid-January 2019. However, the 
“grand national debate” prevents it from 
being heard. President Macron has thus 
also seized control of a key issue from his 
fiercest adversary: citizens’ participation 
in political debate. 
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Reform after Revolt? 
The “grand national debate” should thus 
help Emmanuel Macron to emerge victo-
rious from the biggest protests since the 
student revolts of 1968. None of his politi-
cal opponents has yet been able to capi-
talise on the popular dissatisfaction. Never-
theless, the remainder of Macron’s term 
in office is unlikely to be any calmer, espe-
cially since his announcement that he will 
resume his reform agenda as of May 2019. 
He plans to reform unemployment insur-
ance and reduce the number of people 
employed in the public sector. His success 
depends on two factors. First, he needs to 
explain his economic and social reform 
agenda better: why is it necessary, and what 
are its goals? When will all those affected 
by the reforms today benefit from them? 
Young people in France in particular are 
asking themselves these questions. They are 
the ones Macron must win over. So far, he 
has not succeeded: 67 percent of 18- to 24-
year-olds currently distrust him. Second, 
Macron must permanently shift the impres-
sion that the actions of the political class 
bypass society. This will only happen if 
political decision-making processes are 
decentralised once again. If he is not able to 
herd the population behind him in the long 
term, the younger generation in particular 
will probably return to the streets and sooner 
or later be driven towards the extreme left 
or right. The current economic slowdown 
provides an unpropitious framework for 
the reform programme – though the yel-
low vests protests have not impressed the 
country’s economy. Yet improved economic 
performance (and thus also the changes 
in unemployment) depends on growth mo-
mentum within and outside the eurozone. 
The political success of the French presi-
dent is in Germany’s strategic interest. There 
is no alternative to Macron in terms of the 
structural reforms required. However, the 
possibilities for support from Berlin are 
limited: France is debating its internal con-
stitution. Moreover, Berlin and Paris remain 
undecided about their economic cooperation 
in and for Europe. The 15 priority projects 
agreed by both sides for implementing the 
Aachen Treaty of January 2019 only men-
tion new technologies, the digital economy, 
and the deepening of the internal market 
in financial services. 
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